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A Meta-Analysis of the Decline 
in the Labor Force Participation Rate
Abstract
This project explores the causes behind the recent decline in the Labor Force Participation (LFP)
rate. The analysis examines the evolution of the LFP rate for different demographic groups to 
gauge the effect of demographic changes. An integral part of the project is an investigation of the 
flows of workers into and out of the labor force to determine whether the LFP rate has been
declining because more workers are leaving or because fewer workers are entering the labor
market. The project also studies the evolution of wages and finds that the decline in the LFP rate
is often accompanied by a declining real wage, which is indicative of the relative importance of
demand versus supply factors.
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Introduction 
The U.S. labor force participation (LFP) rate, which measures the fraction of the 
population1 that are either employed or unemployed but actively looking for a job, peaked at 
67.3 percent in early 2000 after increasing for about 40 years. Since then, the LFP rate has been 
declining for most of this century.  In particular, it declined to about 66 percent by the end of 
2004, remained roughly flat for longer than two years until the start of the Great Recession in the 
second half of 2007, and then declined to 62.4 percent in September 2015. The LFP rate has 
remained slightly below 63 percent in the last two years. A closer look at the LFP rate by age, 
gender, and education reveals that it declined for most of the demographic groups (Hipple 2016). 
The decline in the LFP rate has attracted a lot of attention with many explanations 
proposed. Some examples are the aging of the population, the increase in school enrollment 
among the youth, the increase in the number of individuals with mental and physical health 
issues (Krueger 2017), the rise in incarceration and criminal records,2 the stagnation of real wage 
for low-skilled workers and the rising wage inequality (Council of Economic Advisers 2016), 
and technological changes that may have either reduced the demand for labor (through, for 
example, the automation of routine tasks and the use of robots. See Acemoglu and Restrepo 
2017) or raised the value of leisure (through, for example, the creation of video games—see 
Aguiar et al. 2017).  
While each of the proposed explanations may contribute to the recent decline in the LFPR, 
their relative importance is not well understood. This project attempts to fill this gap.  
                                                 
1 The population referenced here includes residents of the 50 states and District of Columbia who are at least 16 
years old and are not active duty members of the armed forces or living in institutions (e.g., nursing homes, prisons). 
2 While incarcerated persons are not included in the calculation of the labor force, there is evidence (e.g., Mueller-
Smith 2015) that past spells of incarceration affect labor market outcomes. 
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We examine the evolution of LFP rate for different demographic groups to gauge the effect 
of demographic changes. We estimate the transition rates across different labor market statuses 
to see whether more workers are leaving the labor force or fewer workers are entering the labor 
force. We also use wage data to get a sense of the relative importance of demand and supply 
factors. Overall, we find that roughly half of the decline in labor force participation is 
attributable to demographic shifts, but that labor force participation within most demographic 
groups has been continuously declining. Disability is an increasingly common impediment to 
work, but wage incentives also play a role, as declines in labor force participation seem to be 
associated with weakening wage incentives to enter or re-enter the labor force. 
Data 
Before proceeding with the analysis, this section briefly describes the datasets used, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is conducted monthly by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and provides the most widely-cited official measure of labor force participation. Its 
main advantages are frequency and sample size: around 60,000 households are surveyed. Owing 
to its size, this data set will be used when possible. However, the set of questions asked in the 
CPS is limited, and the same respondents are not followed over long periods of time.3 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has tracked a representative cohort of 
respondents and their offspring since its inception in 1968. While the PSID affords a smaller 
sample of individuals than the CPS, it provides more detailed information about respondents (in 
particular, health), and has the additional advantage of following the same people over time. 
                                                 
3 For more information on the CPS, see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/technical-
documentation/methodology.html 
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However, the latest wave available for the PSID is 2015, which precludes the use of this dataset 
for very recent analysis. In the sections that follow, the text will note which data set is used for 
which analysis. 
Statistical Decomposition 
We start by categorizing the population into different demographic groups by age4 and sex, 
and quantifying the contribution of each group to the overall decline in the LFP rate. As each 
group is likely to be affected differently by the explanations mentioned above, the relative 
contribution of each demographic group to the overall decline in the LFP rate serves as an 
indication of the relative importance of each explanation. 
The LFP rate in any period can be expressed as the average of the LFP rate of each 
demographic group 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 weighted by its share in the population 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑖𝑖(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Accordingly, the difference in the LFP rate between any two periods can be decomposed into 
two components: (1) changes in the distribution of population across demographic groups, 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and (2) changes in the LFP rate of each demographic group, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, as follows 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑖𝑖�(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)� 
From this decomposition, we calculate the contribution of demographic shifts ∑𝑖𝑖�(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, as well as the behavioral change in each demographic group 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) to 
the overall change in the LFP rate between the two periods (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖). As demographic 
                                                 
4 Individuals 80 and older are grouped together, as exact ages for elderly respondents are not available for the whole 
sample.  
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shifts over time are mechanical, we will focus on the behavioral changes within each group in 
the following. 
Given the evolution of the LFP rate in the last two decades, we perform the decomposition 
four times: (1) for the 1990s, (2) between 2000 and the start of the Great Recession in 2007, (3) 
between 2008 and 2015, and (4) for the last two years. The comparison between (1) and (2) will 
be informative as to whether there are behavioral changes around 2000, and if so, their 
importance for the changing behavior of the overall LFP rate. The comparison among the last 
three decompositions will be informative of whether the Great Recession has any temporary and 
long run effects on the LFP of each demographic group. Table 1 gives the results of the 
decomposition, using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  
Table 1: Decomposition of changes in labor force participation 
Year 
Labor force 
participation 
(%)5 
Change (pp) Demographic contribution (pp) 
Behavioral 
contribution (pp) 
1990 66.53    
2000 67.07 0.55 0.85 -0.31 
2007 66.04 -1.03 -0.61 -0.42 
2015 62.65 -3.39 -1.61 -1.77 
2017 62.85 0.20 0.72 -0.52 
                                                 
5 Labor force is computed from CPS data provided by IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2017), weighted using the final 
person-level weight for 1990 and composite weight thereafter, to match published Bureau of Labor Statistics figures. 
 5 
Figure 1: Decomposition of changes in labor force participation 
 
For all the time periods considered, the behavioral contribution is negative, signaling that 
on average, labor force participation within demographic groups has been continuously 
declining. The increases in overall participation from 1990 to 2000 and from 2015 to 2017 can 
be entirely explained by demographic shifts. Between 2000 and 2015, the behavioral and 
demographic contributions to the decline in overall labor force participation were comparable. 
The lion’s share of this overall decline—more than 3 percentage points total—occurred 
following the 2008 recession. 
What can account for the participation shifts within these demographic groups? One 
potential cause is increasing enrollment in school, which often precludes labor force 
participation. Enrollment has indeed increased since 1990 (Figure 2), but the labor force 
participation of enrolled students has declined since 2000, counteracting the effect on the overall 
participation rate.  
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Figure 2: Enrollment and labor force participation 
 
Workers may also remain outside the labor force if they are disabled. Beginning in 2008, 
the CPS started asking respondents about various types of difficulties: hearing difficulty, vision 
difficulty, difficulty remembering, physical difficulty, disability limiting mobility, and personal 
care limitation. Over the limited timespan for which data are available, the fraction of workers 
reporting any difficulty (of those listed above) has increased only modestly (Figure 3). The labor 
force participation of those reporting difficulty has broadly declined.   
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Figure 3: Disability and labor force participation 
 
The PSID has fewer respondents but asks more detailed questions about respondents’ 
health, and has been doing so for longer than the CPS. In particular, the PSID asks respondents if 
they experience disability that limits their ability to work.6 Figure 4 shows that work-limiting 
disability has increased over time for all but, perhaps, some of the youngest workers. Disability 
does, indeed, seem to prevent more and more people from working. 
                                                 
6 Specifically, respondents are asked if they “have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or 
the amount of work [they] can do?” Those who answer yes are asked “For work you can do, how much does it limit 
the amount of work you can do--a lot, somewhat, or just a little?” We code responses “A lot” and “Somewhat” as 
indicating a work-limiting disability. 
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Figure 4: Work-limiting disability by age 
Note: Each line displays the result of a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression. 
Transitions into and out of Labor Force 
Given the relative importance of behavioral changes for each demographic group 
recovered from the statistical decomposition, we proceed to analyze the causes behind the 
behavioral change for each group and investigate whether these behavioral shifts over time are 
correlated across demographic groups. A lack of correlation suggests that different explanations 
may be needed for different demographic groups. Otherwise, common factors affecting all 
groups may be required. 
We will start by constructing the transition rates among the three labor market statuses 
(employed: E; unemployed: U; out of labor force: N) and track their behaviors over time. Let 
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𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  be the transition rate between status 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 for demographic group 𝑖𝑖 at time t, the 
instantaneous change in the LFP rate at time t, ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, can be expressed as  
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − �𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
where, abusing notations a little bit, we use E, U, and N to represent both the three labor market 
statuses and the share of the population in those statuses.  
A decline in the LFP rate occurs when the second term on the right-hand side is larger than 
the first term. That is, more workers are exiting from either employment (E) or unemployment 
(U) into nonparticipation (N) than entering the labor force from nonparticipation. A decline in 
LFP is associated with an increase in 𝑁𝑁 because, by definition, 𝑁𝑁 = 1 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 1 − (𝐸𝐸 + 𝑈𝑈). As 
a result, in order for the LFP rate to keep decreasing, we need 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  to decrease relative to 
𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .  
It is interesting to know, for each demographic group, which of the four transition rates 
contributes to the majority of the recent decline in the LFP rate. While an increase in the 
unemployment-to-nonparticipation rate 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and a decrease in the nonparticipation-to-
employment rate 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  could both result in a decrease in the LFP rate, they have potentially 
different implications for the labor market. For example, an increase in 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   could imply that 
more workers are discouraged away from the labor market due to a low job-finding rate, a 
decrease in 𝜋𝜋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   is consistent with a rise in the value of leisure. The policy implications from 
these two cases are certainly different.  
Following Shimer (2012), we can estimate the different transition rates for each 
demographic group in each period using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). With 
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the estimated transition rates, we can investigate whether the same transition rate is responsible 
for the decline in LFP rate for all demographic groups. 
Specifically, let 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be the 3x3 matrix containing the transition rates between states {𝐸𝐸,𝑈𝑈,𝑁𝑁} in continuous time. Shimer (2012) demonstrates that this can be computed from 
monthly CPS data as follows. First, let 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be the analogous month-to-month transition rates for 
demographic group i. This is not necessarily equal to 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; note that for example the upper-left 
entry of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (the chance of being employed given employment the previous month) will include 
the possibility of losing one’s job but finding new employment in less than a month. The 
continuous time transition matrix can, however, be computed from the month-to-month 
transition matrix as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝜇𝜇�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)−1. 
Here 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 3x3 matrix of eigenvectors of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝜇𝜇�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a 3x3 matrix containing the log 
eigenvalues of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 along the diagonal; for further details see Shimer (2012). For this section’s 
analysis, we bin individuals into four age groups: younger than 30, 30 to 44, 45 to 59, and older 
than 60.  
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Figure 5: Transitions to employment from outside labor force 
 
Figure 5 shows the transition rates into the labor force to employment. Figure 5: 
Transitions to employment from outside labor forceFigure 5 shows a marked decline in 
transitions to employment following the 2008 recession for all but the oldest workers, from 
which none of these groups has yet recovered. The data are noisy, but the youngest group of 
workers seems to have experienced a secular decline in transitions into the labor force, consistent 
with an increased value of leisure for these workers.  
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Figure 6: Transitions to unemployment from outside the labor force 
 
Figure 6 shows how often workers who are not in the labor force transition to 
unemployment — an active search for work. Notable in Figure 6 is the increase in those looking 
for work during and following the 2008 recession. This may reflect the fact that as wage earners 
lost their jobs in the downturn, their adult dependents may have had to look for work themselves. 
This uptick seems to have been temporary, as the transition rates from out of the labor force to 
unemployment have returned to prerecession levels. In particular, the rate at which workers 
younger than 30 who are not in the labor force begin looking for work has resumed its secular 
trend lower and fallen to its lowest level in decades.  
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Figure 7: Transitions out of the labor force from employment 
 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the rates of transition out of the labor force from employment 
and unemployment, respectively. Figure 7 shows a secular decline in employed older workers 
leaving the labor force, as people choose to retire later and later. For the youngest group of 
workers, however, the trend is the opposite (albeit much more moderate) – more employed 
workers have been leaving the labor force, save a dip following the recession. Employed workers 
aged 30 to 59 are unsurprisingly unlikely to quit the labor force, and this has not changed much 
over the sample period.  
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Figure 8: Transitions out of the labor force from unemployment 
 
Transitions out of the labor force from unemployment (Figure 8) are more volatile and thus 
harder to interpret. But for the youngest group of workers, the trend appears similar to that for 
employed workers. Overall, therefore, young workers seem to be both more likely to leave the 
labor force and less likely to enter or return. The increasing disengagement of young workers 
with the labor force is of particular concern, as the consequences of human capital development 
are further-reaching than they would be later in the life cycle. 
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Separating Demand and Supply Factors Using Wage Data 
Most studies on the recent decline in the LFP rate do not look at wage data. We argue that 
wage data are useful in distinguishing different explanations. 
Broadly speaking, explanations proposed in the literature fall into two categories, demand 
and supply. While demand factors such as the automation of routine jobs and the use of robots 
will reduce the LFP rate and wage at the same time, supply side factors that lead to a decrease in 
the LFP rate are likely to result in an increase in wages. For example, if the LFP rate decreases 
due to an increase in the value of leisure through the creation of video games, it is likely to work 
through a higher reservation wage. Similarly, a decrease in the LFP rate due to more people with 
mental and health problems will result in a higher wage as the labor supply curve shifts to the 
left. As a result, we use wage data to infer whether demand or supply factors are more important 
for the recent decline in the LFP rate. 
Coevolution of wages and LFP 
In particular, for each demographic group, we track the evolution of wage and correlate it 
to the evolution of the LFP rate over time. In addition, looking across groups, we investigate 
whether the growth rate of wages is related to the decline of the LFP rate.  
Specifically, let 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be the average wage of demographic group 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡. Within 
each group, we can use the sign of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) as an indicator for whether demand 
or supply factors are more important for the decline in the LFP rate for this group.  
Since these calculations only require data on average wages and labor force participation 
within demographic groups, we will here again use data from the CPS, which have the benefits 
of large sample size and representativeness within year. We use log hourly wages, which are 
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deflated using the Consumer Price Index Research Series (CPI-U-RS) from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
Table 2 gives, by age group and time period, the covariance over time (the frequency is 
monthly) between average hourly wages and average labor force participation for women; Table 
3 gives the analogous figures for men.  
Table 2: Covariance between wages and LFP of women 
 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪(𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊,𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ), Women 
 Age 
Years <30 30 to 44 45 to 59 60+ 
1990 to 1999  -0.005 0.465 0.840 0.308 
2000 to 2006  0.067 -0.467 0.233 0.706 
2007 to 2014  0.099 0.286 0.554 0.591 
2015 to 2017  0.167 0.503 0.247 -0.067 
Table 3: Covariance between wages and LFP of men 
 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪(𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊,𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ), Men 
 Age 
Years <30 30 to 44 45  to 59 60+ 
1990 to 1999  -0.202 0.209 -0.137 -0.062 
2000 to 2006  0.120 0.348 0.127 0.322 
2007 to 2014  0.351 0.695 0.640 0.387 
2015 to 2017  0.160 0.455 0.500 -0.063 
 
For convenience, negative covariances are colored red. These signal groups in which, for 
the indicated time period, average log wages grew while LFP declined (or vice versa). For most 
demographic groups, however, wages and labor force participation tended to vary together from 
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month to month. This suggests that declines in wages may have reduced the incentives to pursue 
employment, resulting in lower labor force participation.  
Across groups, we can use 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(∆ log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ) as an indicator for whether demand or 
supply factors are more important for the between-group variation in the decline of the LFP rate. 
Table 4 gives the results for each time period. 
Table 4: Covariance between growth in wages and LFP across groups 
Years 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪(∆ 𝒍𝒍𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ,∆𝑳𝑳𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 ) 
1990 to 2000  0.000861 
2000 to 2007  0.001019 
2007 to 2015  0.000707 
2015 to 2017  -0.000057 
For this table, a group is considered to be all people of the same age (in years) and sex. So 
∆ log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is, for example, the difference in average log wages for group i between (in the first 
row) 1990 and 2000, and similarly for LFP. The covariance across groups is weighted by the 
groups’ populations in the base year. 
The across-groups covariance between growth in wages and growth in LFP is positive for 
all periods except 2015—2017 (and even then, the negative correlation is an order of magnitude 
lower). In general, demographic groups with declines in wages tended to lower their labor 
market participation, a signal that workers left the labor market as incentives to work declined. 
This is consistent with the evidence from within-group variation: Declines in labor force 
participation may be, in part, attributable to stagnation in wages. 
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Starting/exiting wages 
It is interesting to consider specifically starting wages 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆   received by workers who were 
previously unemployed or out of the labor force, as well as the last wage 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁   received by 
workers who exit the labor force directly from employment, because these are the relevant 
margins that are directly related to the LFP decisions. In particular, we would expect a decline in 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆   if demand factors are more important, and an increase in 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁  if supply factors are more 
important.  
For this analysis, we use data from the PSID. The PSID does in certain years ask for 
respondents’ starting wages at their current jobs, as well as their final wages at their previous 
jobs. However, the sample is too small to draw inference about changes over time. Instead, we 
look at the log wage of workers who reported undergoing a spell of unemployment in the past 
year, and compare it to their last reported7 log wage. This does not perfectly capture starting 
wage or exiting wage. And for workers currently out of the labor force, it does not guarantee that 
they did not experience a spell of unemployment in between working and leaving the labor force. 
However, it should still be indicative of the cost of undergoing a spell of unemployment, and the 
relevant wage incentives surrounding labor force entry and exit. All wages are deflated using the 
CPI-U-RS. 
                                                 
7 Through 1997, the previous wage will be the previous year’s, as respondents were interviewed annually. From 
1999 onward, the previous wage will be from two years prior, as the PSID switched to only interviewing 
respondents every other year. 
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Figure 9: Starting wages and exit wages for workers leaving the labor force 
 
Figure 9 gives the average log starting wage as well as the average log previous wage for 
workers who are not in the labor force. The growth of starting wage of workers entering or re-
entering the labor force has lagged behind mean exit wages over the sample period. This 
suggests that even if incentives to remain in the labor force remain strong, the incentives to 
rejoin the labor force may be declining. As noted, this analysis is imperfect as we cannot be sure 
that the workers leaving the labor force are doing so directly from employment, or that the mean 
starting wage is truly representative for the type of worker choosing to leave the labor force from 
employment. 
We also examine the evolution of the difference between the starting wage and the last 
wage for workers coming out of a nonemployment spell, log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 − log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 , as well as the returns 
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to continued employment. Both of them measure the wage loss from employment gaps. Other 
things equal, the larger is this loss, the less likely a worker will return to the labor force. 
Table 5 shows, by time period, the average change in log wages for workers who reported 
undergoing a spell of unemployment. The standard deviations are too large to draw firm 
conclusions, but the point estimates following 2000 are larger than the one for the 1990s, 
consistent with an increased wage penalty for unemployment spells. 
Table 5: Change in wages following unemployment 
Years 
Change in log 
wages following 
unemployment 
Standard 
deviation 
1990 to 1999 -0.044 0.982 
2000 to 2006 -0.156 1.198 
2007 to 2015 -0.107 1.289 
Return to continued employment 
We estimate the return to continued employment using the following equation 
log𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Here 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of individual characteristics including an individual fixed effect (which 
absorbs characteristics that don’t change over the sample period, such as gender, race, and 
education), state fixed effects, a year fixed effect, and the total work experience of individual 𝑖𝑖 at 
time 𝑡𝑡. 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the length of the current employment spell, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. In this 
specification, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is a measure of the return to continued employment in period time 𝑇𝑇. 
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We use panel data from the PSID to estimate 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 for each period. An increase in 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 over 
time is consistent with an increase in the cost of employment gaps, which is likely to discourage 
workers out of the labor force. We will investigate this by studying the joint evolution of 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 and 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 over time.  
Figure 10: Estimated return to continued employment 
 
The main takeaway is that the association between continued employment and wages has 
grown substantially, especially following the 2008 recession. So relative to continued 
employment, this suggests a growing penalty for time spent not working, which would 
discourage labor force participation.  
Since the potential determinants we have studied are likely correlated with each other, and 
most of them are likely affected by other factors not considered in this project, this study may not 
be able to estimate the causal effect of each potential determinant. However, by relating the 
evolution of LFP rate to the evolution of most of its potential determinants, this study is 
informative as to which groups of factors are most likely to be the main drivers behind the recent 
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decline in the LFP rate. The results of this section add an important nuance to the analysis of the 
previous section, demonstrating that the lack of wage growth associated with declining labor 
force participation may be explained in part by increasingly large wage penalties for 
unemployment spells. 
Discussion 
This paper decomposes the decline in labor force participation, and explores some 
evidence for why more workers are choosing not to seek employment. While roughly half of the 
decline in labor force participation since 2000 can be attributed to demographic shifts, 
participation within groups has continuously declined as well. Young workers in particular have 
been both less likely to enter the labor force and more likely to leave. Across the age spectrum, 
disability seems to be an increasingly common factor limiting work. Between and across 
demographic groups, we find evidence of covariation between wages and labor force 
participation, which is consistent with lagging wage growth discouraging workers from seeking 
employment. The association between wages and continued employment has been growing, 
suggesting increasing incentives to remain employed, but decreasing incentives to return to 
employment for those out of a job. So overall, much of the decline in labor force participation 
may be related to the wage incentives associated with participation and entry in particular.  
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